

# Diaspora and Small Country Economic Development

Aleksandr V. Gevorkyan<sup>1</sup>

## Abstract

The promise of diaspora business networks is yet to materialize in a sustainable fashion. This paper offers a realistic, survey-based, perspective of diaspora driven economic development in small economies of Europe and the former Soviet Union. Emphasizing new waves of international migration and remittances flows, the literature puts disproportionate hope on diaspora to fill the structural voids, what this paper calls a diasporization argument, to motivate international business growth. Informed by a unique Armenian Diaspora Survey, this paper critiques the conventional view and proposes a new analytical framework, reaching three conclusions. First, a diaspora is a multilayered socioeconomic construct, diminishing its first-mover potential. Second, any successful engagement is a function of a sustained interaction of a diaspora with homeland. Finally, in the absence of systemic engagement infrastructure, a diaspora transfer of nonmonetary skills is short-lived. Thus, small open economies remain structurally disadvantaged integrating international business networks. This paper attempts to inform international business and policy literature on small open economies that are seeking to diversify their development approaches, especially following the 2020 economic and health crises.

Keywords: development, diaspora, economic policy, migration, remittances  
JEL: F3, O11, P2

## 1. Introduction

The many challenges in the twenty-first century include the problem of development in small open economies (SOEs) of the broad emerging markets group. For the purposes of this paper, a country's designation as an SOE is based on a typical emerging economy having a weak or underdeveloped industrial structure and the relative distance of the economy from the major technological highways in global value chains, manifested in the countries limited macroeconomic

---

<sup>1</sup> Aleksandr V. Gevorkyan is the Henry George Chair in Economics at the Tobin College of Business at St. John's University; email: [gevorkya@stjohns.edu](mailto:gevorkya@stjohns.edu). Parts of this paper are based on the author's earlier work, *Transition Economies: Transformation, Development, and Society in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union* (Routledge, 2018), [www.agevorkyan.com](http://www.agevorkyan.com). The author thanks Otaviano Canuto, Arkady Gevorkyan, Rebecca Maria Mari, Ronald Suny, Khachig Tölölyan, and Artyom Tonoyan for their comments on earlier drafts.

significance in international trade and finance. Typically, these are low- to middle-income economies with high outbound migration that are largely dependent on economic ties with a single trading partner. The problem is in the choice of a model of economic development in such a country that is appropriate for achieving sustainable and inclusive growth with consideration of the local specifics in terms of the climate, terrain, existing industrial base, traditional sectors, and geopolitics.

The question of a future economic development model is nowhere as urgent as in the small post-socialist economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU). Since the reforms in the 1990s, the economic models in force across the vast region have had varying levels of success (e.g., Gevorkyan, 2018; Roaf et al. 2014) as each of the now-independent countries sets its individual course of development. The crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has revived the urgency of the discussion.

Much hope has recently been placed in the promise of national diasporas as potential conduits for economic development, international business, and institutional change in their ancestral homelands (for a broad review, see, e.g., Newland and Patrick, 2004; Riddle and Brinkerhoff, 2011; Clemens et al., 2015). Compared to decades ago, the newly formed diasporas—an outgrowth of recent labor migration waves—benefit from new technology, knowledge, greater mobility, and network effects, as they are often viewed as drivers of economic growth in some SOEs. Yet, in the absence of accurate data on this potential or clear infrastructure in place to realize this engagement, much of the academic and policy literature is tilted toward what can be called diasporization in economic development, in which external agents of progress (entrepreneurial and skilled members of the diaspora and organizations) are seen as having a broad positive (potential) impact, whereas in reality the contributions of the diaspora to development are often ad hoc, or, at best, dispersed

compared to the scale of the home country's economic needs (e.g., Tölölyan, 2007).

World Bank data have suggested that global expatriates have given significant charitable, humanitarian, and financial support to their homelands (e.g., World Bank 2019). The monetary transfers come largely from labor migrants' remittances, and a substantial portion depends on fundraising efforts in the local diaspora communities, occasional contributions by affluent individual expats, and one-time projects carried out by diaspora-based organizations. Although remittances to individual countries consistently exceed foreign direct investment (FDI) flows, they are a function of a trading partner's (or labor migration host country's) business cycles and migrants' remaining ties with their home country. As of mid 2020, however, remittances are expected to drop by 20 percent compared to the previous year with a disproportionate detrimental impact on the least-developed economies (World Bank, 2020). To date, no general institutional infrastructure has emerged to take advantage of diasporic connections to the home country (Aguinas and Newland, 2011), leaving the full diaspora potential much discussed but largely untapped.

Building on this background and the results of a unique Armenian Diaspora Survey (ADS), this paper explores opportunities for nonfinancial contribution of diasporas to sustainable economic development in SOEs. The collective skills transfer by diaspora professionals can spur growth across diverse industries, as is often mentioned with regard to India's information technology (IT) sector (Pande, 2014). However, is diaspora activity sufficient to ensure a broader effect and, if that is the chosen strategy, filling all structural voids in development? What is the true diaspora potential? Finally, what infrastructure can be adopted to ensure the optimal outcome?

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 strikes at the core of a perceived

unified diaspora argument by introducing the concept of “old” and “new” age diasporas in a catch-all category we call dispersion. Section 3 addresses the effectiveness of the current diaspora’s economic impact in the CEE and FSU. Section 4 reviews some of the possible policies that could optimize diaspora engagement. Section 5 presents the ADS and briefly describes the diaspora portal concept as a model for infrastructure to encourage a diaspora’s contribution to industrial development in SOEs. Section 6 develops a broader conceptual view of diasporas’ contributions to development in SOEs. The paper ends with our conclusions.

## **2. Conceptualizing the Types of Diasporas: A Dispersion**

In developing countries, diaspora networks, which often formed because of historical or recent economic, social, and political turbulence or sometimes on ad hoc basis, have long since been popularized as conduits of economic development, helping to combat poverty, promoting job creation, and transferring technology, knowledge, and best business practices to the country of their birth. Clearly, concern has arisen when a substantial population loss occurs, furthering a brain drain. Bang and Mitra (2011) suggest a positive correlation between a country’s higher institutional capacity and stronger emigration incentives for higher-skilled workers than for lower-skilled ones, even in the presence of political stability—relevant factors in CEE and the FSU.

Nevertheless, the literature on development has placed particularly high hopes in the “first movers” and positive feedback from return migration (e.g., McGregor, 2014; Boly et al., 2014; Gevorkyan & Gevorkyan, 2012; Ketkar and Ratha, 2010; Freinkman, 2001). However, the practical difficulty of implementing the vision of diaspora first movers requires a clear understanding of the nature of the relationship between the home country and the diaspora.

In this respect, the flow of remittances alone does not tell the full story. As much as recent literature has focused on the labor migration aspect of the diaspora, the diaspora age aspect has gone largely unnoticed. This is not in relation to individual diaspora members' age but a collective characterization of the diaspora group that each associate with based on a range of factors. Historically, the waves of outward migration from CEE and the FSU (and within) have contributed to burgeoning diaspora networks shaping altruistic motives by the "old" groups. For ease of distinction, the "new" diaspora is largely made of immigrants following the post-1990s liberalization reforms and more recent labor migrants. The "old" is comprised of established citizens of the host countries to which either they or their ancestors emigrated long ago. The "old" group retains nostalgic impulses to assist distant countries of origin. Chander (2001) was one of the first to offer a comprehensive analysis of the altruistic motivations of the "old" diaspora with respect to their country of origin.

Conceptually, the "old" diaspora has common ethnic or religious roots with the "new" diaspora, and the members of this "old" diaspora have cultural (and some tangible) ties to their birth country. By definition, the "old" diaspora is a more established and, often, more affluent entity. In an environment of globalization, they are reinvigorated by the "new" diaspora and can develop a significant urge to take part in the development efforts in their ancestral home through humanitarian aid or other "soft" (e.g., educational, cultural exchanges) projects. Because it has greater institutional business leverage, the "old" diaspora's relationship with its country of historical origin (home country) can lead to more significant and systemic positive feedbacks to that country's development, depending on the effectiveness and strength of the link between an individual country and its diaspora.

While precise estimates of diaspora communities are rare, much of the evidence comes from census and dedicated diaspora agencies. In the FSU context, the size of the “old” diaspora, formed in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, is consistently large due to regular population movements through the twentieth century (e.g., see Gevorkyan, 2018, table 8.4; Heleniak, 2011, 2013; UN, 2014). Here, host economies (countries where expatriates settle) and communities with established “old” diasporas tend to attract “new” migrants. In some cases, the determining factors may be the prospect of economic opportunity or geographic proximity to the country of origin. New labor migrants (especially from the home country’s rural areas) tend to be attracted to area with an existing nucleus of (either old or new) compatriots (Gevorkyan and Gevorkyan, 2012).

The distinction between the “old” and the “new” diasporas is critical for understanding the success or failure of diaspora-driven development and the diaspora potential. Diaspora studies often overlook a definitional problem implied by the conceptual uniformity of the diaspora. Regarding as monolithic any ethnic, cultural, religious, or other kind of diaspora that *a priori* is altruistically interested in development of their country of origin is bound to lead to disappointment.

Rather, the term *dispersion*—as in a widely scattered distribution of people, resources, ideas, and actions—more accurately characterizes the complex web of factional, political, business, and other divisions, interwoven with the history of an expatriate community that has some type of common background (for background, see the discussion of contemporary diaspora definitions and the applications in interdisciplinary studies in Tölölyan [2007]). Here, the inherent diversity of experience, the dispersion effect, can act as a brake on the development of the home economy,

instead of helping to drive it. Although the representatives of the “old” and the “new” diasporas may share some views of their home country on major strategic issues, their practical actions, ideas, and beliefs on other country and community specific topics can be in conflict (Gevorkyan, 2015). The dispersion effect indicates heterogeneity in a wide range (political, religious, community, territorial origin, and other) of backgrounds.

Added to the above are even greater divisions between the expatriate community and the countries of origin. The effect is exemplified in diverse efforts at involvement and the obvious lack of systematic institutional engagement aimed at comprehensive development of those countries of origin, aside from various one-time humanitarian and cultural projects. For a detailed narrative on the different modalities in relations between diasporas and their countries of origin in CEE/FSU, see Heleniak (2011, 2013). This brings us to an analytical assessment of the effectiveness of diaspora networks in development and poverty alleviation specifically in those countries of origin.


### **3. Measuring the Effectiveness of Diasporas**

Temporary labor migration can make a (temporary) positive contribution to poverty reduction through the transfer of regular remittances and skills (e.g., Agunias and Newland, 2012; Newland, 2010; Ratha and Mohapatra, 2011). If left to its own devices, the ad hoc temporary labor migration model does not lead to a sustainable development path or make a significant contribution to evolution in the SOEs’ industrial policy.

The typical labor migration cycle follows several rounds of short trips, as breadwinners often eventually emigrate with their families, effectively cutting off the home economy from financing

based on remittances. At that stage temporary migration becomes permanent. Still, the role of remittances in some CEE/FSU economies has historically been quite important as data in Figure 1 suggest. The distribution of remittances by recipient country is not balanced. Remittances remain to be the major source of household consumption budget in a few SOEs, while seem to play a lesser significance in others.

Figure 1. Personal remittances received as a share of GDP in the CEE/FSU (%)



Source: Author's estimates based on WDI (2020).

From a macroeconomic perspective, it may be argued that reliance on remittances can erode the competitiveness of the domestic labor market, as the incentives to compete for jobs are outweighed by consumers' higher purchasing power and in fact interfere with homegrown economic growth (e.g., Chami et al., 2008). Furthermore, Chami et al. (2018) argue that evidence of remittances' contribution to SOEs' economic growth is lacking, and, indeed, data is scant. However, if SOEs need to be able to attract greater FDI to build up competitive sectors, one could argue that the



diaspora can be the greater contributor, consistent with the potential promise of the “old” and the “new” groups. In fact, in a recent analysis of structural transformations of small economies in sub-Saharan Africa, Nissanke (2019) argues that diasporas are active participants in development finance. The premise is that diaspora investors are “more willing to take currency risks or other country risks,” an observation to which we return below.


To provide a high-level take on the above, we construct a diaspora dependent indicator for external financial inflows comparing the country’s sum of FDI and remittance inflows per capita to the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita between 2000 and 2018. The results in Figure 2 show some countries with relatively modest pre-transition recovery in GDP per capita but with high inflows of combined external investments (e.g., Croatia, Hungary, and combined Serbia and Montenegro). However, there are also those with strong per capita income growth but relatively weak external inflows. For the top performers, FDI flows play a much greater role than remittances. To some extent, this observation is also consistent with the fact that countries with smaller income gains (bottom left from the average point) have smaller per capita inflows.

On balance, however, the evidence is mixed. Countries with high diaspora potential seem to be underperforming on the FDI-remittances per capita measure. It appears that those countries have not attracted significant levels of external investment in per capita terms, which raises two concerns.

First, the large-diaspora country’s attractiveness for investment is not a given. Becoming involved in global capitalism also means entering global competition for limited capital, which is a

challenge for emerging markets and the CEE and FSU countries in particular. Second, the collective “old” and “new” diasporas potential appears to have not been fully mobilized on a more sustainable basis. The latter observation is particularly hard given diaspora’s attempts in times of crises yet remaining as ad hoc involvement rather than a more sustainable push consistent with the “first-mover” view. In the end, the inability to secure sustained external financing either to motivate domestic aggregate demand or longer-term investment projects (via FDI) is a serious deterrent to macroeconomic development models in some of the post-socialist SOEs.

Figure 2. FDI and Remittances per capita vs. GDP per capita, 2000-2018 (USD)



Source: Author's estimates based on WDI (2020) and Conference Board Total Economy Database (TCB, 2020).

Note: see the text for an explanation of the vertical axis data.

Another challenge to diaspora might be less where to invest or how to allocate resources in formal terms than the inability to penetrate local markets. Over the three decades since the transition reforms, the evolving local business networks are now competing with potential diaspora capital. From the perspective of domestic firms, financial and project-driven investment by expatriates is viewed as competition, rather than as additional support for a country's development. This dynamic between the local and diaspora businesses requires a more careful dedicated analysis.

As found in Figure 1, only a handful of the CEE and FSU countries benefit from high (and consistent) remittance inflows. Furthermore, recent World Bank data (WB, 2020) corroborates the dominance of a single source of remittance revenue in most cases (primarily, monetary transfers are initiated by labor migrants from either Russia for the FSU countries or EU/UK for the CEE). That raises concern about recipient countries' sustainability and susceptibility to business cycles in sender countries, a scenario that played out after the 2008-2009 financial crisis and following devaluation of the Russian ruble (on the losses in the leading remittances, see Gevorkyan [2018], table 8-3).

There is also a question on the spending direction of received remittances transfer. Piras et al. (2018), focusing on agricultural changes in Moldova, find that remittances from labor migrants received by rural households gave them only limited flexibility in decisions about farm-related upgrades. Moldova is one of the highest recipients of remittances from labor migrants, as they contribute over 25 percent of GDP. Most of those transfers seem to fuel consumer markets, rather than going toward productive use, as agriculture is dominated by conglomerates, and small farms

lack access to a broader inclusive finance scheme.

Elsewhere, Licuanan et al. (2015), in a study on the Philippines, which has one of the most developed systems of labor migration and remittance flows, find that the financial contributions of the diaspora (i.e., labor migrants) to the country's rise with migrant's income earned abroad and the frequency of hate crimes against migrants in the host countries. Some evidence also indicates that money flows to recipient countries with higher emigration, rather than those that are the least developed.

What we learn from these observations is that, from a macroeconomic development perspective, diaspora-led financial transfers (either donations or remittances) tend to be project or action specific. Despite their statistical significance in the country's GDP and consumption expenditure, little evidence suggests that individually motivated remittances have helped to support the structural transformation of an industrially weaker economy.

As such, there is no lack of initiatives to explore the "beyond remittances" (e.g., Newland and Patrick, 2004) multiplier effects from diaspora-led FDI, technology transfers, philanthropy, tourism, political contributions, and cultural influences. Even despite limited scale and available data, some evidence suggests that, in economies with wide diaspora networks, the "old" diaspora's active business role has been critical to some macroeconomic gains (e.g., Armenia, Georgia, Poland, and Ukraine). In Armenia, for instance, diaspora business networks are the source of over 60 percent of recent FDI and multinational enterprises either started by or with influential management representation by diaspora professionals (e.g., GIZ, 2011). Yet, Armenia does not

score on the Figure 2 composite FDI and remittances index.

For Georgia and Moldova, large-scale migration began with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, whereas Armenia's Western diaspora has been in existence since at least the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. In contrast to the Armenian diaspora, the Georgian and Moldovan diasporas are relatively small and have not demonstrated the same level of broader economic vibrancy in home-host country engagement (GIZ, 2012).

But what type of diaspora-to-home country involvement is adequate for guaranteeing a strong and lasting contribution to the domestic economy in general or any specific sector? A handful of countries (e.g., Armenia, Bulgaria, Georgia, Moldova, Poland, Tajikistan, and Ukraine) have tried to put some of these mechanisms in place (e.g., Gevorkyan, 2018; Heleniak, 2011; Newland, 2010). For example, Armenia and Georgia now have a range of development, education, humanitarian, philanthropic, and political projects involving individuals in the "old" and the "new" diasporas. Moreover, both have adopted a dual citizenship law (joined by Moldova and the Kyrgyz Republic).

At the same time, the practice of "fuzzy citizenship" (Skrentny et al. 2007) has developed, which means a status that grants semi-permanent residence to the diaspora. For example, Poland has established a "card of the Pole" as a document that allows a member of the Polish diaspora to obtain a work permit, establish a business in Poland, gain access to the country's education system at no charge, and attain other benefits normally unavailable to citizens of other countries (MFA, 2015). Other countries either initiate (as in the Polish model) or create the conditions for expatriate

entities to engage (as in the Armenian model) in economic and social activities (for a thorough review of the involvement of each diaspora in its country of origin, see Heleniak [2011]).

#### *A Midway Assessment*

The cumulative evidence so far points to two thoughts. On the one hand, although some social and macroeconomic improvement is undoubtedly due to diaspora actions, the dispersion effect of the scattered, unorganized nature of these efforts might be a net negative disincentivizing and slowing homegrown economic progress. On the other hand, if a country's fundamental macroeconomic and political environment is relatively predictable (e.g., as in some CEE countries that are European Union member states), dispersion can have a positive effect. In that case the economy benefits from having a variety of medium- to long-term investment and cultural projects, driven in part by diaspora organizations, often transforming domestic institutional arrangements (the latter point raised by Riddle and Brinkerhoff, 2011).

Broadly, the variations observed in the diaspora engagement models can be explained by (1) the distance between the expatriate's current country of residence and country of origin; (2) the relative distinction between the "old" and the "new" diasporas' motivations; (3) political stability and macroeconomic conditions in the country of origin; (4) the expatriate's legal status in the host country; and (5) the existence of a functional engagement infrastructure for the diaspora's involvement in the home economy.

Recent evidence suggests that almost every CEE/FSU country has formally acknowledged some type of relationship with its diaspora (e.g., ministry or high-profile regular gathering), through humanitarian projects or diaspora participation in the country's public life (Gevorkyan, 2018;

Heleniak, 2011). Yet, on the practical side there is still the lack of systemic, large-scale institutionalized involvement of the diaspora in macroeconomic development of its country of origin.

We conclude this section by noting that in the CEE and FSU region and for the SOEs, in particular, a comprehensive plan that targets a multitude of macroeconomic development goals is still absent, despite variations in some countries (in particular, in humanitarian work or one-time large investor projects).

#### **4. Some New and Not So New Policy Proposals**

Some existing policy proposals involving the diaspora are aimed at poverty alleviation. One proposal that has gained support in CEE and the FSU is the issuance of diaspora sovereign bonds. The proposal is often brought up as a potentially effective method of engagement in the economy between the countries of origin and their expatriate communities, a topic well covered in Chander (2001), Gevorkyan (2011), and Ratha and Mohapatra (2011), among others. This is also consistent with the perception of greater currency risk tolerance in other countries and their willingness to invest in instruments denominated in the local currency, as discussed earlier (for examples of diaspora bond issuers in sub-Saharan Africa, Nissanke [2019]).

Alternatively, diaspora micro-loans to rural areas or diaspora business-funded basic income programs are other methods of proactive involvement. The volatility of global primary commodity supplies and prices exerts additional macroeconomic and financial pressure, exacerbating poverty in the smaller (commodity-exporting) countries. Hence, these diaspora micro-loans can be

advantageous in particular for post-socialist economies with limited exposure to global capital markets, limited FDI inflows, and a still-evolving banking system.

Among other conceptual policy solutions, Gevorkyan and Gevorkyan (2012) develop a diaspora regulatory mechanism (DRM) to coordinate temporary labor migration in a mutually effective fashion for both the home and host countries. In this model, the remittances flow to a migration development bank (MDB). This arrangement builds on a wealth of existing labor migration frameworks in advanced economies and elsewhere.

#### *The Migration Development Bank Concept*

The concept of an MDB needs to be elaborated. The starting point is the complexity in the direction and sustainability of remittances, shaped by migrants' connections with their home countries. As the remittance inflow abruptly ends (with reunification of the migrant's family), there is a radical disruption to the potential benefits of remittances for the home economy.

Another layer of complexity is due to the distinctions between the "old" and the "new" diaspora. The gap between the promise and the results of diaspora participation in development can be bridged by establishing an MDB coordinated by a DRM in the labor migration process. The DRM engages the "old" diaspora, which integrates and even employs the "new" labor migrants.

Funding for MDB projects would come from temporarily unclaimed deposits, new direct loans and borrowing from regional and international financial markets as well as by partially reinvesting earned interest. Further, a bilateral government deposit guarantee or active engagement by



multilateral development agencies in the MDB charter could mitigate some of the risks. Operational transparency could be gained by involving members of both the “old” and the “new” diaspora in a Diaspora Supervisory Board as a policy-setting and decision-making entity.

As a bilateral bank, relying on newest financial technology and mobile banking, the MDB could offer a systemic alternative to the currently ad hoc remittances, channeling them into savings accounts that are accessible to home-country recipients. The bank can then raise funds for and sponsor development projects in the home’s infrastructure, education, and health care as well as tackle poverty and environmental and sustainability issues. Addressing these migration push factors with reinforced funding might become a game changer beyond post-socialist transition regions and across other SOEs with substantial remittance inflows and “new” diasporas. The MDB’s development focus would be driven by country specifics, targeting core regional underdevelopment problems, and stemming the exodus of the labor force, with a broader positive effect on macroeconomic stabilization.

Establishing an MDB would also help channel remittance flows to productive needs on a macro scale, factoring out the sources of turbulence and fragility in these income streams. An MDB would attract new diaspora investors who are hesitant about entering the market in their country of origin. For a non-diaspora investor, who is unfamiliar with local conditions but seeks portfolio diversification, an MDB sponsored fund could be an alternative that would facilitate initial entry to the local market. The host economies would benefit, as some of the funding could be directed to better administration and regulation of labor migrants in their home countries (e.g., financing diaspora centers, publications for labor migrants, and efficient fast-track immigration screening).

The involvement of the “old” diaspora, which would not have to dedicate significant resources to the country of origin, is critical to the success of the DRM and MDB frameworks. A great deal of activity takes place in the new country of residence, in which the “old” diaspora participates through organized recruitment agencies and diaspora centers to help new migrants settle into their new environment and to provide employment. In this way, the labor migration triad (host country labor displacement, capital transfers, and wage impacts) is balanced in a mutually beneficial way for all participants.

There is also room for continuation of the “soft” aspect of relations between diasporas and their countries of origin, through education, culture, business, and other kinds of exchanges. It is not difficult to envision cooperation on a joint strategic development project that would be long term and have an ultimate goal of macroeconomic development. Hence, the view of the dispersed diaspora business networks as an alternative source of broader economic development and guarantor of financial stability remains viable.

## **5. The Armenian Diaspora Survey**

The discussion above reveals another problem, which is that of developing a dataset that can offer a basis for fruitful discussion. To address this challenge, from 2015 to the spring of 2018, we conducted an online survey in English with no external funding or any organizational endorsement or sponsorship, called the Armenian Diaspora Survey (ADS)—not to be confused with another

recent study funded by the Gulbenkian Foundation.<sup>2</sup> The ADS included 28 questions with sub-queries (for a complete list of the survey questions, see Appendix A).

Over time, the ADS was publicized on various online community groups via social media, by email, and in various news outlets. By April 2018, the ADS had collected 513 valid anonymous responses. Methodological challenges notwithstanding, the online survey results could provide new directions for more informed diaspora-home country initiatives. The diversity of data collected offers additional opportunities for analyzing results with a range of filters (e.g., geographic origin, gender, age, occupation). In addition, the ADS ended in April 2018, at the time of political upheaval in Armenia, with diaspora's initial enthusiasm for the changes. Therefore, it would be interesting to see how perceptions may have changed since then in a follow-up survey, yet another avenue for a future researcher.

The first group of questions in the ADS were demographic: 44.4 percent of the respondents were female and 55.6 percent male; 99.2 percent identified as Armenian (82.7 percent of the respondents said that both their parents were Armenian). The distribution across two age groups was fairly even, with 30 percent born between 1960 and 1979 and 27 percent born between 1980 and 1989, whereas while the share for both 1930-1959 and 1990-1999 was 21 percent.

In terms of their current occupation, 10.3 percent of the respondents were students, 4.1 percent were retired, and 69 percent selected "Other" as their occupation without specifying it here but directly alluding to it in later questions on proposed professional involvement with their home country. In terms of education, 62.2 percent of the respondents had a college degree, and 15 percent

---

<sup>2</sup> For details see the Gulbenkian Foundation's Armenian Diaspora Survey website <https://www.armeniandiasporasurvey.com/> // Information about the Armenian Diaspora Survey (ADS) discussed in this paper can be found at <http://agevorkyan.com/diaspora-survey/>

had a graduate degree, in the social sciences, humanities, and technical fields.

The majority of respondents ranked their Armenian language proficiency as high (37.6 percent said they had native-level proficiency). Eastern Armenian is the official language of the Republic of Armenia, and Western Armenian, selected by 57.3 percent of respondents, is predominantly spoken in the Armenian diaspora in Europe, the Middle East, and the Americas. Several (but statistically minor group of) respondents contacted us directly by email to say that they considered themselves equally fluent in both Eastern and Western Armenian as native speakers, however, the survey did not permit them to choose both.

Several questions concerned respondents' origin, including the country of birth, permanent residence, citizenship, and current residence. The majority of respondents were part of the "old" diaspora, with a wide geographic dispersion in their country of residence. Over 62 percent of respondents said the country of their current residence was the US, with 7 percent indicating Canada and 4 percent, Russia.

A large majority of the respondents had visited Armenia, 73.3 percent at least once and 42 percent within a year of taking the survey; 58.7 percent of the responses indicated no direct immediate family ties in Armenia (the importance of this response will become clear below). These visits were largely short (one to two weeks). This result does not necessarily imply that the trip was for tourism, because business trips are also short.

The respondents indicated that they followed news on Armenia regularly and expressed a strong (49.6 percent) and somewhat strong (30.6 percent) emotional attachment to the country (as a historical and cultural homeland) and the broader Armenian community. They were largely interested in Armenian history, politics, culture, economic conditions, and, critically, social

development, though at varying degrees. The age groups with the highest degree of local Armenian community involvement were those born in 1930-1979 and 1990-1999.

In general, despite their interest in Armenia's ongoing socioeconomic development, respondents expressed little interest in moving to Armenia for permanent settlement or for work (implying a contract of short duration). The strongest desire to move to Armenia on a permanent basis was expressed by the youngest age group (20.2 percent said there was a strong possibility they would do so, the highest of all groups). This result is to be expected, as the prospect of changing one's domicile necessarily require definite answers about employment and sustained living standards. Both factors can be more easily adjusted at the beginning of a person's career.

Further, as might be expected in a diaspora study, the majority of the respondents (59.6 percent) indicated that they had previously donated to an Armenian organization, whereas 82.8 percent indicated readiness to help organizations (as opposed to individuals) based in Armenia or in the diaspora, though the majority are not currently providing any assistance to anyone in Armenia. On average, the respondents indicated willingness to contribute between \$100 and \$500 on an annual basis to support such organizations.

This somewhat limited willingness to provide monetary assistance (several answers indicated financial constraints) was significantly offset by the respondents' emphasis on nonfinancial assistance. The range of possible responses to the survey questions appeared to be insufficient, as many used the comments sections to elaborate on transfers of various kinds of soft skills that they were willing to explore.

Specifically, individual ADS responses indicated a strong preference for virtual presentations and knowledge sharing as a means of nonfinancial connection with Armenia. Those were followed by stated preferences for volunteering as teachers, research cooperation, infrastructure collaboration, and medical services. These choices largely reflected the respondent's individual professional background and strongly correlated with education levels. Several respondents with a college or doctoral degree indicated interest in teaching, including some who specified "free of charge" during the summer. Others offered their services in consulting, diplomacy, coaching sports teams (hockey, in particular), and even joining the military reserves. Majority of the educational focus responses came from the college-educated respondents of all ages.

As to the overall respondents' perception of establishing connection with Armenia, one common thread concerned perceived institutional irregularities in Armenia. These views drove some of the individual responses (visible in raw data), though we are unable to determine the basis for these individual opinions. Another suggests that their active involvement with Armenia was hindered by having insufficient personal funds. At the same time, these respondents also signaled having a strong interest in the social and economic development initiatives in Armenia.

Perhaps most importantly for applied policy were comments about the absence of an organizational engagement infrastructure to support such active involvement and encourage stronger connections between diaspora-based specialists and their counterparties at respective professional entities in Armenia. Potential educators are willing to connect either online or travel to Armenia if an infrastructure existed to engage with local peers, to provide accommodations for longer stays, and to organize volunteering.

The respondents expressed interest not only in humanitarian or charitable assistance but in cooperation in business, education, and other kinds of projects. This could lead diaspora-home country engagement into a new, more sophisticated level of development in the technology age. The diaspora age is also a factor. This is especially significant in Armenia; where the “old” diaspora is mostly made up of the Western Armenian diaspora (identified in the ADS as those who indicated Western Armenian as their primary language), living in Europe, Middle East, and North America. For these individuals the connection to the present Republic of Armenia is more symbolic, given the nation’s history, than purely “ancestral” in its narrow definition of land of origin. In the ADS, respondents who are members of Armenia’s new diaspora have higher education levels, though somewhat lower income. These idiosyncratic distinctions appear to be relevant for evaluating the effectiveness of the diaspora-to-homeland engagement models and specific proposals for engagement.

#### *A Proposal for Developing a Diaspora Portal*

Capturing the latent-potential revealed in the ADS results could be facilitated by developing a diaspora portal (DP) as a web-based sorting and matching database. This DP would be accessible to anyone in the diaspora who has an interest in becoming involved in whichever professional capacity is appropriate by registering online and filling out a form. It would equally be accessible to the residents in the home country. The accuracy of the data and security of exchanges can be ensured with elements of the blockchain technology.

An algorithm then verifies and clears a new request and allocates to an appropriate information bucket and industry category. The latter action results in 1) the information being distributed to

the subscribers on the receiving side and 2) automatically storage in the general searchable database. There is a possibility for automatic filtering and sorting and matching in case of precisely submitted DP signal.

As a technological solution to an old problem in the new context of global challenges, such a DP could also offer a much-needed formalized institutional framework connecting professionals around the world with development needs in Armenia. This could be a transparent and trustworthy way to overcome the obstacles raised in the ADS. As such, this DP could serve as a novel initiative for harnessing and directing the constructive energy of human capital and going beyond ad hoc and personal remittances, the unclear prospects of a diaspora bond discussed earlier, and other monetary-based efforts to sustain development in an SOE.

## **6. A Critique of ADS-like Efforts, the Need for Them, and a Diaspora Model of Development**

With respect to diaspora-home country involvement, a more informed economic policy decision needs to be derived based on the available evidence to avoid the diasporization trap. Our attempt to gathering such information in the case of Armenia through the ADS is just a one step in that direction. Although it indicates the possible contributions that diaspora-based specialists could make to SOE development, especially in new high-tech sectors, the data collected have some limitations.

The ADS results can play an important role in crafting a diaspora-oriented policy but also come with the usual problems from using self-reported survey data. The anonymous responses raise a



valid concern over their accuracy, as well as whether the good intentions expressed will ever be realized. It is equally difficult to confirm the skills and specializations claimed in some of the responses and comments.<sup>3</sup> The use of the portal suggested here could address this problem, as confirmation of an applicant's claims would be possible with its algorithm and blockchain technology.

Another concern due to relying only on new technology for a solution may be that the gains from cooperation between the diaspora and the home country accrue disproportionately to a particular sector. The problem of niche sector development is clear in the recent concerns raised around IT sector development (e.g., for India, Pande, 2014). In the CEE/FSU the IT sector comprises a minimal share (in terms of revenue and employment) of the overall economy yet benefits from disproportionately large financial gains to its highly skilled labor force. Because it is a niche sector, this pattern raises problems of scalability at the national and international level; lacking broad access to new technology without continuous contacts with foreign counterparts (e.g. diaspora); and evolving regulation. Moreover, the IT sector's output, though advanced by the diaspora's participation, may not satisfy domestic economy needs, as consumers opt for more mundane choices, which are needed for the sector's survival.

Nevertheless, the potential for a powerful macroeconomic lift from the involvement of the diaspora, in particular, by skilled workers, in development in SOEs experiencing outward migration could be a game-changing factor in industrial policy. The lack of consensus among the diaspora, the dispersion effect, and the lack of sustainable institutional arrangements (or as referred


---

<sup>3</sup> The author is grateful to Dr. Khachig Tölölyan for bringing up some of the concerns mentioned in this paragraph.

earlier, engagement infrastructure) between expatriate communities and their countries of origin have limited development on both sides.

Based on the foregoing discussion, it may still be possible to sketch a conceptual model of diaspora’s constructive role in an SOE development. For that purpose, we adapt from Gevorkyan (2018) and extend here a diaspora driven model of home-country economic development. Without any assumptions on pre-existing engagement instruments, Figure 3 illustrates the evolution of four critical factors: (1) macroeconomic development, (2) social development, (3) political change, and (4) migration. The ideal outcome is in gradual improvement in all four factors (e.g., measured as index) and an overall movement in the north-east direction of the diagram.

Figure 3. A diaspora driven economic development framework



Source: adapted from Gevorkyan (2018)

Note: direction of arrows indicates improvement in the corresponding indicator; multiple equilibria are possible; best outcome direction is in the north-east quadrant.

The top horizontal axis measures business and economic development. This first factor accounts for including industrial structure, FDI, and remittance flows, accounting for the diaspora's entrepreneurial contribution to the country's industrial policy. Note that the MDB and DP play a role in facilitating strong improvement in this factor. The second factor, at the bottom horizontal axis, measures broad socioeconomic development, including a range of "soft" development categories that are often critical in macroeconomic growth. The left-hand vertical axis measures political and institutional change. The right-hand vertical axis measures the gains from migration. This fourth factor accounts for repatriation and return labor migration. However, the migration index should also capture the actual process of immigration, which would be strongly applicable in the cases of the "old" diaspora. Recall, that for this group, the ancestral country may not have been the actual birthplace for neither the "repatriate" nor their parents. Hence, the immigrant shock of adjustment in a new place may be stronger than in the case of return migration (as is often presented in the cases of returning labor migrants).

We focus on two scenarios, illustrated by the two curves deviating from the diagonal in Figure 3, which represents perfectly equal distribution among all four factors. The deviations occur for many reasons, including the lack of unity across the diaspora (i.e., dispersion) and lack of systemic engagement infrastructure, though relying on diaspora's latent-potential as suggested by the ADS results. For example, the quadrants labeled A and B both represent equal progress in social, business, and economic involvement but vary significantly on the extent of the diaspora's political

involvement in the home country and degree of repatriation. Similarly, quadrants C and D show the same levels of political involvement and repatriation, though with the opposite level of involvement in the economic structure and social development. Scenarios to represent specific countries could be elaborated.

Figure 3 captures current and potential scenarios. The current scenarios encompass concerns that are immediate and difficult to address through economic theorizing—the role of geography, legacy institutions, and predominant economic structures (as found in an analysis of small open Caribbean economies by Constantine and Khemraj [2019]), which are critical to development success in the small CEE/FSU economies. Most of these countries are either landlocked or far from global trade routes and face massive geopolitical risks that also shape domestic institutions. As such, it is tempting to view the diaspora as a possible push factor in national development models.

Ultimately, the success of diaspora networks in development in the countries of origin is especially critical in the efforts to combat poverty and to support the survival of the smaller economies. In these structurally weaker post-socialist economies, which are geographically remote from key trade and industrial centers, external pressures are particularly strong, the domestic market is weak, and fiscal efforts may be insufficient due to budget constraints.

By overcoming the dispersion effect, diasporas have the potential to introduce positive systemic change in their country of origin and help address the immense human costs of post-socialist transformation as well as to contribute to designing industrial policy. For a small country in a competitive global economy, harnessing that capacity is an important development milestone.

## 7. Conclusion

The diaspora potential for SOE development, and more narrowly industrial policy, has far-reaching and positive promise. It is especially critical following the 2020 economic and health crises. Yet, the absence of accurate data on the said potential leads to further diasporization in economic policy—as SOE’s structural voids are hoped to be filled by external agents (diaspora).

Countering some of the general views, this paper finds concrete indications that the modalities of diaspora involvement and the deterrence factors appear to be significantly more complex and diverse than previously assumed, requiring closer scrutiny by development economists. The lessons from the ADS, though it is based on Armenia, are relevant to other post-socialist SOEs. Overlapping waves of migration, internal political and cultural divisions, and differences in socio-economic status divide diasporas from within, creating what we refer to as dispersion.

We argue that it may be possible and feasible to go beyond remittances in post-socialist SOE economic development, going so far as to motivate structural industrial change, fostering a closer integration within international business networks. In that, broad institutional instruments such as a diaspora portal or a Migration Development Bank play an important role within a diaspora driven framework, nurturing latent-potential of the expatriate community.

The model derived in this paper offers some initial analytical contours to pave the way for a more formal analysis of the role of the diaspora in the home country’s development. Of course, this assumes that, at a more philosophical level, it is in the mutual interest of the two communities—the home country and its diaspora—to build stronger connections with each other.

## References

- Aguinas, D., and K. Newland. 2011. *Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Boly, A., N.D. Coniglio, F. Prota, and A. Seric. 2014. Diaspora investments and firm export performance in selected sub-Saharan African countries. *World Development*, 59: 422-433.
- Chami, R., E. Ernst, C. Fullenkamp, and A. Oeking. 2018. Is there a remittance trap? *Finance & Development*, 55(3). Available at <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2018/09/is-there-a-remittance-trap-chami.htm>.
- Chami, R., A. Barajas, T. Cosimano, C. Fullenkamp, M. Gapen, and P. Montiel. 2008. Macroeconomic consequences of remittances. Occasional paper 259. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
- Chander, A. 2001. Diaspora bonds. *New York University Law Review*, 76: 1005–1099.
- Clemens, M. A., Ozden, C., Rapoport, H. 2015. Reprint of: Migration and development research is moving far beyond remittances. *World Development*, 65: 1-5.
- Constantine, C. and T. Khemraj. 2019. Geography, economic structures and institutions: A synthesis. *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics*, 51: 371-379.
- Freinkman, L. 2001. Role of the diasporas in transition economies: Lessons from Armenia. Paper presented at the 11th annual meeting of the ASCE. Available at [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2401447/](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2401447/).
- German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). 2011. Current situation of the diaspora connected FDI in Armenia. Yerevan: GIZ Private Sector Development Program South Caucasus.

- German Agency for International Cooperation (GIZ). 2012. The Georgian diaspora study. Tbilisi: GIZ Private Sector Development Program South Caucasus.
- Gevorkyan, A.V. 2015. The legends of the Caucasus: Economic transformation of Armenia and Georgia. *International Business Review*, Vol 24 (6): 1009–1024.
- Gevorkyan, A.V. 2016. Development through diversity: Engaging Armenia’s new and old diaspora. Migration Information Source (March 23), <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/development-through-diversity-engaging-armenias-new-and-old-diaspora/>.
- Gevorkyan, A.V. 2018. *Transition Economies: Transformation, Development, and Society in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union*. Oxford: Routledge.
- Gevorkyan, A.V., and A. Gevorkyan. 2012. Factoring turbulence out: Diaspora regulatory mechanism and Migration Development Bank. *International Migration*, 50(1): 96–112.
- Heleniak, T. 2013. Diasporas and development in post-communist Eurasia. Migration Information Source. Available at <http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/diasporas-and-development-post-communist-eurasia/>.
- Heleniak, T. 2011. Harnessing the diaspora for development in Europe and Central Asia. MIRPAL Discussion Series. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Ketkar, S., and D. Ratha. 2010. Diaspora bonds: Tapping the diaspora during difficult times. *Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy*, 1(2): 251–263.
- Licuanan, V., T. O. Mahmoud, and A. Steinmayr. The drivers of diaspora donations for development: Evidence from the Philippines. *World Development*, 65: 94-109.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland (MFA). 2015. Card of the Pole. Available at [http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/foreign\\_policy/polish\\_diaspora/card\\_of\\_the\\_pole/](http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/foreign_policy/polish_diaspora/card_of_the_pole/).

- Newland, K. 2010. *Diasporas: New Partners in Global Development*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Newland, K., and E. Patrick. 2004. *Beyond Remittances: The Role of Diaspora in Poverty Reduction in Their Countries of Origin*. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Nissanke, M. 2018. Exploring macroeconomic frameworks conducive to structural transformation of sub-Saharan African economies. *Structural Change and Economic Dynamics*, 48: 103-116.
- Pande, A. 2014. The role of Indian diaspora in the development of the Indian IT industry. *Diaspora Studies*, 7(2): 121-129.
- Piras, S., M. Vittuari, J. Möllers, and T. Herzfeld. 2018. Remittance inflow and smallholder farming practices. The case of Moldova. *Land Use Policy*, 70: 654-665
- Ratha, D. 2003. Workers' remittances: An important and stable source of external development finance. *Global Development Finance* World Bank.
- Ratha, D., and S. Mohaparta. 2011. Preliminary estimates of diaspora savings. Migration and Development Brief 14. Migration and Remittances Unit World Bank (February 1).
- Riddle, L. and J. Brinkerhoff. 2011. Diaspora entrepreneurs as institutional change agents: The case of Thamel.com. *International Business Review*, 20 (6): 670-680.
- Roaf, J., R. Atoyian, B. Joshi, and K. Krogulski. 2014. *25 Years of Transition: Post-Communist Europe and the IMF*. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
- Skrentny, J.D., S. Chan, J. Fox, and D. Kim. 2007. Defining nations in Asia and Europe: A comparative analysis of ethnic return migration policy. *International Migration Review*, 41 (4): 793-825.



Tölölyan, K. 2007. The contemporary discourse of diaspora studies. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, 27(3): 647-655.

World Bank (WB). 2019. *Migration Development Brief 31 (April 2019)*. Washington, DC:

World Bank. Available online: <https://www.knomad.org/publication/migration-and-development-brief-31/>.

World Bank (WB). 2020. *Migration and Development Brief 32: COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration Lens. (April 2020)*. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available at

<https://www.knomad.org/publication/migration-and-development-brief-31/>.

World Development Indicators (WDI). 2017. World Development Indicators Online Database.

Available at [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org).

## Appendix A

### Armenian Diaspora Questionnaire

The purpose of this project is to evaluate the Armenian diaspora's willingness to and actual involvement in Armenia's economic, social, and cultural development.

#### DEMOGRAPHICS

1. Do you consider yourself to be of Armenian background/origin?

Yes                      No

2. Please select your Armenian ethnic background.

- a. Both parents Armenian
- b. One Armenian parent
- c. One Armenian grandparent
- d. One Armenian great grandparent
- e. Other:

3. Are you

Male                      Female

4. Please specify your date of birth (mm/yyyy format) \_\_\_\_\_

5. What is your current occupation? \_\_\_\_\_

6. What is the highest level of your education?

- a. Grade school or less
- b. Some high school
- c. High school graduate
- d. Some college/technical school
- e. College degree
- f. Post graduate work or degree
- g. Prefer not to answer

7. What was your major field of study? \_\_\_\_\_

8. What is your current total annual approximate monetary income (before taxes)?

- a. Less than \$40,000
- b. \$40,000-\$49,999
- c. \$50,000-\$59,999
- d. \$60,000-\$74,999
- e. \$75,000-\$99,999
- f. \$100,000-\$149,000
- g. \$150,000-\$199,999
- h. \$200,000 or more
- i. Prefer not to answer

9. Please rank your proficiency in the Armenian language (5 being native and being able to read, write, and speak as native)

1      2      3      4      5

9a. Is it Western Armenian or Eastern Armenian?

Western

Eastern

10. Please specify the country in which you currently reside. \_\_\_\_\_

10a. If different from where you currently reside, specify your country of permanent residence.

\_\_\_\_\_

10a1. If different, how long will you be at your current residence before returning to your permanent residence? \_\_\_\_\_

10b. What is your country of origin (place of birth)? \_\_\_\_\_

10b1. When did you or your family immigrate to the country of your permanent residence?

\_\_\_\_\_

11. Have you ever been to Armenia?

Yes

No

11a. If yes, when was the last time you visited Armenia?

- a. Within the past year
- b. 1-2 years ago
- c. 3-4 years ago
- d. More than 4 years ago

11b. If yes, how long was your stay?

- a. Less than 1 week
- b. 1-2 weeks
- c. 3-4 weeks
- d. 5-8 weeks
- e. More than 2 months

12. Do you have any immediate family/relatives in Armenia?

Yes                      No

13. How often do you follow the current events in Armenia?

- a. Several times a week
- b. Once a week
- c. Once every two weeks
- d. Once a month
- e. Less than once a month
- f. I do not follow current events in Armenia

14. How interested are you in each of the following areas about Armenia?

	1 = Not at all interested	2 = Somewhat interested	3 = Fairly interested	4 = Very interested	5 = Extremely interested
History					
Social events					
Political events					
Economic conditions					

15. On a scale of 1 to 5 please rate your emotional attachment to Armenia (1 being not attached at all, 5 being extremely attached)

1            2            3            4            5

16. On a scale of 1 to 5 please rate how much moral responsibility you feel towards Armenia (1 being not at all responsible and 5 being extremely responsible)

1            2            3            4            5

### INVOLVEMENT WITH ARMENIA

17. On a scale of 1 to 5 please rate how interested you are in moving to Armenia permanently (1 being not at all interested and 5 being extremely interested)

1            2            3            4            5

18. On a scale of 1 to 5 please rate how likely you are to move to Armenia for permanent settlement (1 being not at all likely and 5 being extremely likely)

1            2            3            4            5

19. On a scale of 1 to 5 please rate how likely are you to move to Armenia to work (1 being not at all likely and 5 being extremely likely)

1      2      3      4      5

19a. If your response is between 3-5, what nature of work will you be involved in?

20. Have you previously worked in Armenia?

Yes                  No

20a. If yes, please state the nature of the work.

21. Have you ever donated to any Armenian organization established in Armenia?

Yes                  No                  I am not aware of any

21a. If yes, please specify the name of the organization for which you donate to.

21b. Please state the frequency at which you donate to the organization.

21c. If no, please explain why you not. \_\_\_\_\_

21d. If you were aware of any such organization, would you be interested in donating?

\_\_\_\_\_

22. Have you ever participated in any sort of fundraising that was directed towards Armenia?

Yes                  No

22a. Please provide some details of the fundraising. \_\_\_\_\_

23. On a scale of 1 to 5 how involved are you in your local Armenian community?

1      2      3      4      5

24. Are you currently providing any financial assistance to Armenia or someone in Armenia?

Yes                  No

24a. If yes, please describe your exact involvement. \_\_\_\_\_

24b. If no, please specify the reason. \_\_\_\_\_

25. If the right opportunity comes along, would you consider providing financial assistance to an individual, organization, or a group dealing with Armenia?

Yes                  No

25a. If yes, please select all that apply.

- a. Armenia-based organization/group
- b. Diasporan organization/group based in Armenia
- c. Diasporan organization/group based in the Diaspora
- d. Other:

25b. If yes, what amount of money would you consider for support:

Less than USD 100   \$100 - \$500   \$500 - \$1,000   More than \$1,000

25c. On what basis?

- a. One time
- b. Monthly
- c. Annually
- d. Other:

26. If you would prefer non-financial assistance to Armenia, what would it be? (select all that applies):

- a. Medical support
- b. Voluntary teaching
- c. Lecturing and knowledge sharing
- d. Academic / research co-operation
- e. Infrastructure
- f. Other:

27. Are there any specific conditions that must be satisfied for your active financial or non-financial engagement with Armenia? Please clarify. \_\_\_\_\_

28. Are there any specific circumstances that may prevent or in any way inhibit your active financial or non-financial engagement with Armenia? Please clarify. \_\_\_\_\_

###